CFO characteristics and opportunistic accounting choice in public sector organizations

Two different theoretical foundations in the literature relate to the quality of financial reporting in public sector organizations: one theoretical foundation is based on economic theory, and the other is based on institutional theory. In addition to examining the traditional factors derived from these theories, this paper focuses on the role of the chief financial officer (CFO), in order to broaden the theoretical perspective and add explanatory power with regards to the empirical testing of opportunistic accounting choice in public sector organizations. Similar to Anessi-Pessina and Sicilia (J Public Adm Res Theory, 30:465–484, 2019), this paper uses upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason in Acad Manage Rev, 9(2):193–206, 1984; Hambrick in Acad Manage Rev, 32(2):334–343, 2007) to conceptually link CFO characteristics with opportunistic accounting choice. The accounting issue addressed herein is related to a statement issued by the standard-setting body within the Swedish municipal sector. Our results suggest that opportunistic accounting choice decreases with CFO tenure and prior CFO experience in municipalities.